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Abstract
This historical study contributes to the extensive literature on comparative advertising by examining the causes and consequences
of comparative advertising wars; that is, when one advertiser responds to a direct or implied attack by another advertiser. Primary
and secondary sources consist of articles published in historic and contemporary marketing and advertising trade journals, such as
Printers’ Ink, Advertising & Selling, and Advertising Age. The findings reveal that well-publicized advertising wars occurred frequently
between major U.S. advertisers throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, and that they most often occurred in
product and service markets characterized by intense competition. Many, if not most, advertisers’ principal motive for responding
to a comparative advertising attack has been emotional rather than rational. The findings also reveal that advertising wars often
became increasingly hostile, leading to negative consequences for all combatants, as well as a broad and negative social conse-
quence in the form of potentially misleading advertising.
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The historical research reported in this article examines the
phenomenon of advertising warfare and what lessons have, or
at least, might, be learned from advertisers’ motives, successes,
and failures. An advertising war occurs when one advertiser
responds to a direct or implied attack by another. Both the orig-
inal attack and the counterattack consist of comparative ads,
those in which advertisers contrast their own products, ser-
vices, or brands with those of a competitor on the basis of some
attribute, benefit, market position, or brand image.
In the 1970s, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
began encouraging advertisers to make comparisons with
named competitors, with the broad, public welfare objective
of creating more informative advertising. Although the wide-
spread adoption of comparative advertising took a little longer
in the European Community, Directive 97/55/EC (European
Parliament and Council of the European Union) established
that it should be permitted as long as, among other require-
ments, it wasn’t anti-competitive, unfair, or misleading.
Industry lore suggests the use of comparative advertising
was rare during the early twentieth century, at least among
major advertisers. However, research indicates its use quickly
increased in the United States. Researchers estimate that the
overall percentage of comparative ads increased from about
7 percent (Shimp 1975; Wright and Barbour 1975) to 23
percent (Taschian and Slama 1984) to as high as 30 percent
(Stewart and Furse 1986). Comparative advertising is more
prevalent on TV, with estimates ranging from 5 to 10 percent
(Brown and Jackson 1977) to 14 percent (Abrams 1982) to
50 percent (Levy 1987) to as high as 80 percent (Pechmann and
Stewart 1990). There are no estimates, however, of the
frequency of advertising wars.
Historian Daniel Pope (1983) identified three reasons why
early advertisers condemned the use of comparative ads:
(1) they were frequently false or misleading, (2) they
‘‘besmirched’’ the honor of advertising and damaged its cred-
ibility, and (3) advertisers preferred to avoid competing on the
basis of price or other forms of business rivalry that could prove
damaging to themselves as well as their competitors. However,
he attributed these negative outcomes to comparative advertis-
ing in general and not to advertising wars.
The comparative advertising research literature is extensive,
including several reviews (e.g., Barry 1993), a meta-analysis
(Grewal et al. 1997), and a limited focus on negative compara-
tive advertising (Beard 2008; James and Hensel 1991; Sorescu
and Gelb 2000). Several surveys of practitioners are available
(Barry and Tremblay 1975; Hisrich 1983; Muehling, Stem, and
Raven 1989; Rogers and Williams 1989), although the findings
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are limited by samples and response rates. Moreover, although
there are signs the number of comparative advertising wars is
on the rise in the first decade of the twenty-first century (York
2009), as well as lawsuits and National Advertising Division
(NAD) complaints resulting from them (York and Zmuda
2010), there are no surveys of either marketing executives or
advertising practitioners specifically on the topic of advertising
wars.
Lacking from the literature, therefore, are many of the
insights to be gained from studying those who have used adver-
tising in open warfare. Thus, the purpose of the research
reported in this article is to explore professional thought
regarding comparative advertising wars. It seeks, in other
words, explanations for why advertisers have chosen to go to
war and what happened when they did. As Startt and Sloan
(1989, 18) note, ‘‘Principles and problems, potential and pitfall
can all be underscored by such knowledge.’’
Research Questions and Data Collection
The general advertising histories (Fox 1984; Laird 1998;
Marchand 1985; Meyers 1984; Pope 1983; Presbrey 1929;
Rowsome 1970; Schudson 1984) and the research literature
devoted to comparative advertising were used during this
study’s immersion and guided entry phases. As described by
Smith (1989, 319), ‘‘After immersion and consideration of the
breadth of data available in a general area of interest, the
researcher focuses on a more specific part of the data in a
process called guided entry. . . . In the process of guided entry,
the historian further delimits the data to be studied and the
process of general question forming begins.’’
The overall purpose of this study and the results of the
immersion and guided entry phases led to the following
research questions: What were the causes or motives behind
decisions by advertisers to engage in sustained hostilities with
one or more competitors? What were the marketing, profes-
sional, institutional, and other consequences, both positive and
negative, resulting from advertising wars?
The collection of a database of professional thought regard-
ing advertising warfare dating to the beginning of the twentieth
century began with a search of the industry’s foremost trade
journal, Printers’ Ink. Affectionately nicknamed The Little
Schoolmaster by its editors and devoted readers, the journal
was published continuously from 1888 to 1972. Many articles
published in Printers’ Ink were written by advertising practi-
tioners, marketing executives, and newspapermen, although the
staff, including founder George Rowell, also contributed edi-
torials and commentary.
One issue from each of the sixty volumes of Printers’ Ink
published between 1900 and 1913 was randomly selected and
scanned because an index for this period does not exist. Sources
for the remainder of the twentieth century through present day
were then identified by means of a literature search, with the
goal of collecting sources as equivalent as possible to those
found in The Little Schoolmaster. This search was aided by the
existence of three business periodical indices: the Industrial
Arts Index (1913–1957), the Business Periodicals Index
(1958–1973), and the ABI/Inform Complete search engine
(1971–2009). The Industrial Arts Index is the only business
periodical index available for the period it covers; it continued
in 1958 as the Business Periodicals Index. Some sources, in
turn, revealed other sources, as well as the existence and loca-
tion of comparative ads that represented attacks or counterat-
tacks in advertising wars. Some of these are included in the
findings, where they provide additional insight into the motives
of the combatants, their tactics, or the consequences of an
ongoing war. The research was conducted as part of a broader
study of comparative advertising. Data collection produced a
database of more than 600 trade journal articles on comparative
advertising, of which some seventy specifically address sus-
tained hostilities between two or more advertisers.
The method does not offer the appraisals of validity and
reliability that quantitative content analysis does. It is consis-
tent, however, with the methods of humanistic and empirical
historical research. Defined by historian David Fischer, an
empirical historian is one ‘‘who asks an open-ended question
about past events and answers it with selected facts which are
arranged in the form of an explanatory paradigm’’ (as cited in
Smith 1989, 317). As Smith (1989, 317) elaborates, ‘‘The expla-
natory paradigm, of course, takes different forms—narrative,
statistical explanation—but always consists of a reasoned, sys-
tematic examination of surviving recorded happenings, written
in a spirit of critical inquiry seeking the whole truth.’’
Findings
Findings are presented chronologically, with the presence of
dominant themes and subthemes supported by representative
observations and statements of primary and secondary sources
in each period. Contradictory themes are also presented when-
ever they occurred. The periodization scheme (Hollander et al.
2005) follows the lead of three important advertising histories
(Fox 1984; Pollay 1985; Pope 1983) and for similar reasons.
Modern advertising emerged and matured during the first three
decades of the twentieth century. The Great Depression of the
1930s and war years of the 1940s substantially affected adver-
tising spending and message strategy. The 1950s and 1960s are
considered by many to be the golden age of advertising creativ-
ity and include the industry’s much vaunted ‘‘Creative Revolu-
tion.’’ The three earlier histories also discriminated between the
1960s and 1970s, although it is especially relevant for the pres-
ent history because comparative advertising began in earnest in
the United States during the 1970s. The final two decades are
presented as a single period mainly for consistency.
Overall, the findings reveal that many well-publicized
advertising wars occurred throughout the more than one hun-
dred years represented by the data. A considerable degree of
consistency exists regarding motives throughout the history.
Outcomes and consequences, for the most part, also remain
consistent, suggesting some validity in the observation of phi-
losopher George Santayana (1905): ‘‘Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’’
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The Turn of the Century to the Great Depression: Baking
Powder Wars and Cigarette Wars
Most advertisers early in the twentieth century claimed to
disapprove of comparative advertising or what they often called
‘‘knocking’’ copy. As a Printers’ Ink writer noted ‘‘In the early
days of the art an advertisement was the voice of a single indi-
vidual proclaiming the merits of his own goods, often coupled
with a warning against similar goods sold by competitors. This
one-man advertisement is still the commonest form of publicity,
but among advertisers nowadays, the knocking of a competitor is
considered not only bad form, but bad business’’ (Broad-gauge
Advertising 1906, 30). Influential copywriter Claude Hopkins
(1930, 20) spoke for many: ‘‘Rule 1 in all salesmanship courses
I have studied is: Never attack a competitor.’’ Concerns about
the truthfulness of comparative price advertising also presented
an early regulatory problem, attracting special scrutiny from the
advertising practitioner ‘‘vigilance’’ committees, whose mem-
bers stepped forward to carry the banner of the progressive
‘‘truth in advertising’’ movement of the 1910s (Pope 1983). Such
statements, however, should not be taken to mean advertisers
rarely attacked each other nor that they did not engage in
warfare. The data reveal that several wars occurred during this
period among, for example, the marketers of cigarettes, baking
powder, automobiles, and tires.
Motives. Most advertisers or industry observers who wrote
about advertising wars agreed that the decision to respond to
an opponent’s attack, rather than a strategically rational one, was
often an emotional one, or one based on ‘‘human nature.’’ A con-
tributor describing a particularly vicious war between Calumet
and the ‘‘Trust’’ baking powders summarized this belief: ‘‘It may
seem strange that, where an advertiser has such direct evidence
that straight promotion talk is the best thing for him, he should be
persuaded to depart into the by-ways of competitive attack. The
explanation lies in the fact that it is human nature to return a
blow for a blow’’ (Hill 1910, 23). A San Francisco ad agency
president in 1928 offered almost the identical observation: ‘‘But
there is much of the peacock in many of us. We like to strut our
insinuating advertisements up and down in front of our compet-
itors. . . . It is human nature—and when human nature runs con-
tra to sound business judgment, our viewpoint is apt to be
somewhat blurred’’ (Brisacher 1928, 161).
Several contributors during this period reported that wars
often occurred when advertisers faced intense competition,
explaining why advertisers of the day referred to comparative
as ‘‘competitive’’ advertising. The term ‘‘comparative advertis-
ing,’’ in fact, did not appear in the literature until 1931 and then
infrequently until the 1970s. In reference to the Baking Powder
War, an observer reported, ‘‘As competition began to show
itself and as many new powders began to be offered at lower
prices, the competitive and denunciatory style of copy was
adopted’’ (Hill 1910, 24).
Several sources described the intense competition among
cigarette marketers during the 1920s. Most linked the competi-
tion to combative advertising and, in particular, P. Lorillard’s
forceful attempt to enter the market and steal sales from leaders
Camel, Lucky Strike, and Chesterfield. At the time, these brands
held nearly 75 percent of the U.S. market (Woods 1929). As
Sales Management reported, ‘‘By 1928 all four companies were
in the thick of an advertising melee such as has not often been
witnessed. . . . The retail price war, which broke out in 1928,
added fury to the conflict’’ (How the ‘‘big four’’ cigarette adver-
tisers stand in the 1929 sales battle 1929, 592). Another source
directly attributed an attack by P. Lorillard to the intensity of the
competition: ‘‘It is doubtful that competition within any other
industry today could have brought forth the type of copy used
by Old Gold . . . . The copy implied that Reynolds, Liggett &
Myers, and American Tobacco, the big three, jealous of Old
Gold’s success, sought to clip its wings by forcing wholesale
price reductions upon it’’ (Lorillard goads big three in cigarette
field 1928, 856). The sample shown in figure 1 clearly reveals
the ‘‘David versus Goliath’’ theme of the campaign.
Figure 1. Old gold ‘‘Goliaths,’’ 1928.
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That advertising wars often broke out when advertisers
faced intense competition explains another finding. Some
sources reported that advertising wars tended to occur simulta-
neously with price wars. For instance, the advertising and price
wars that broke out among cigarette marketers in the 1920s was
preceded by a similar one nearly three decades earlier. In his
description of tobacco monopolist James Buchanan (‘‘Buck’’)
Duke’s raid on the British tobacco industry and the ensuing
advertising war, John S. Grey (1902, 16), a frequent contributor
to Printers’ Ink, reported, ‘‘The prices, too, are being cut, and
the chances are that whichever party wins out at the end will be
the loser anyhow, as the cutting process has already gone so far
as to annihilate profits.’’
Consequences. Several writers and observers during this
period strongly implied that many advertisers who engaged
in open warfare came to regret it. Two related consequences
help explain this regret. First, observers reported a tendency for
hostilities to escalate, with claims on either side becoming
increasingly vicious (or what they called ‘‘invidious’’). As an
agency president wrote, ‘‘The average advertiser who casts
insinuations at competitors usually soon finds the weaknesses
of his own products alluded to in his competitors’ advertising.
Few, if any, products are made so perfectly that certain weak-
nesses cannot be found and perhaps exaggerated to such an
extent that they will prove both embarrassing and harmful’’
(Brisacher 1928, 167). Following George Washington Hill’s
attack on the ‘‘sweets’’ industry (‘‘Reach for a Lucky Instead
of a Sweet’’), a chain of candy stores counterattacked with this
warning: ‘‘Do not let anyone tell you that a cigarette can take
the place of a piece of candy. The cigarette will inflame your
tonsils, poison with nicotine every organ of your body and dry
up your blood—nails in your coffin’’ (as cited in Lucky Strike
and the candy industry mobilize for battle 1928, 10).
A second and related consequence, also explaining regret,
was the tendency for the escalation of hostilities to cause dam-
age to both combatants. One type of damage was to the reputa-
tions of the advertisers and their brands. Writing about George
Washington Hill’s war on the sweets industry, the president of
the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange Inc., observed,
‘‘Has Mr. Hill forgotten that it was only a short time ago when
some of our states, on health grounds, were legislating against
cigarettes and that the term ‘coffin nails’ was applied to them?
Would it not be well for the American Tobacco Company to
‘Let sleeping dogs lie?’’’ (Lowry 1929, 790). A Printers’ Ink
author many years after the Baking Powder War warned that
this kind of damage could last for years: ‘‘Lots of people still
alive and well can vividly recall the days of some years ago
when they were repeatedly warned to beware of ‘benzoate of
soda.’ . . . Eventually, the various manufacturers and adverti-
sers of foods discovered the alarming effect such copy was hav-
ing on their business, and they recovered their reason by
stopping all such publicity’’ (Hanley 1927, 10).
Advertisers and observers who addressed the strategic value
of a war consistently noted the tendency for combatants to lose
focus on their own selling. George Washington Hill
summarized this belief in his reference to his confectionary
opponents: ‘‘If they would forget about our campaign and
devote themselves to making their own merchandising interest-
ing and constructive, they would never have occasion to com-
plain. When you start worrying about the other fellow’s
business you cease to sell your own merchandise’’ (as cited
in Hughes 1929, 401).
Some advertisers during this period expressed the belief that
consumers tend to respond negatively to advertising wars. As
one noted, ‘‘Isn’t the public suspicious of sweeping claims of
superiority and allegations that no one except the advertiser
himself should be credited with common honesty? Isn’t it
human nature to take the part of the underdog and to resent a
holier-than-thou attitude?’’ (Hill 1910, 25). In early 1930,
R. J. Reynolds directed figure 2’s aggressive attack on Hill and
American Tobacco, after the FTC had ordered Hill to cease
using ‘‘tainted’’ testimonials and making the claim that
‘‘Luckies’’ would help smokers lose weight. Claude Hopkins
(1930, 20) argued that consumers would respond negatively
to Reynolds’s opportunistic attack: ‘‘Some methods strike a
responsive chord which lead to overwhelming favor. Some
arouse dislike. I hope that George Hill will not take up the
gauntlet Camel has laid. I think that a shiver went over all of
us when we read that page attack.’’
Only a single source attributed positive consequences to an
advertising war. An anonymous banking executive described
his view of Hill’s attack on sweets, arguing that both sides as
well as consumers could benefit: ‘‘Even the public at large may
derive advantages sufficient to justify the cost, it is contended,
since such advertising brings out values in products that have
never been generally known. This type of sales effort helps
to make the public the real arbiter of what it shall buy; and,
if properly weighed, tends to raise the level of intelligence upon
which demand and consumption are based’’ (What a bank
thinks of the cigarette-sweets war 1929, 101).
The Great Depression and the War Years: The ‘‘Dirty
Laundry Effect’’
Advertisers and industry observers who wrote about advertis-
ing wars during the 1930s revealed the occurrence of numerous
wars between major competitors, among them tires, automo-
biles, gelatins, salad dressing versus mayonnaise, coal versus
natural gas heating, iceboxes versus mechanical refrigerators,
and even Florida versus California orange growers. Beard and
Nye (2010) found that, by the early 1930s, publishers were
agreeing unanimously that comparative advertising had
become a serious regulatory problem, often requiring rejection
of ads. However, only a few sources discussed advertising wars
in the 1940s, possibly a consequence of large reductions in
advertising spending during World War II and an expanding
economy, product shortages, and a seller’s market at the end
of the decade.
Motives. The belief that it was ‘‘human nature’’ to launch a
counterattack was prevalent during the 1930s. Ralph Star
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Figure 2. R. J. Reynolds Attack, 1930 (Credit: R. J. Reynolds).
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Butler (1931, 105), an advertising pioneer and author of the
first textbook on marketing, summarized the view of the major-
ity: ‘‘Human nature being what it is, there comes a time when
fighting back seems to be the only recourse of the advertiser
who has tried to do business on a constructive basis.’’ As
another writer observed, ‘‘It is an understandable temptation
for any dealer selling in a given community to strike vigorously
at competition which he regards as unfair. . . . Yet, it is a fact of
human nature that, however right he may be in his thinking, he
must be careful how he calls such a condition to the attention of
the community’’ (Copy should avoid criticism of competitors
1936, 83).
Two additional motives were mentioned during this period
but by only two sources. The first is that advertisers often
respond to attacks because they enjoy a fight. Writing about
the advertising war between California and Florida orange
growers, Business Week observed, ‘‘Much as they may pub-
licly deplore the violence done professional ethics, advertis-
ing men privately relish nothing more than a juicy
competitive copy fight’’ (Califlorida orange growers fight
1937, 21). The second, that wars can occur inadvertently, was
stated by long-time Printers’ Ink editor C. B. Larrabee (1934,
57): ‘‘Some smart young advertising man gets what is known
in the trade as a ‘swell idea.’ . . . Too frequently such an idea
is loaded with dynamite because it will almost inevitably lead
to a competitive war.’’
That intense competition often leads to warfare was men-
tioned by industry leader Joel Benton, then president of the
American Association of Advertising Agencies, in a lecture
to the feuding tire industry. Benton (1932, 55) also proposed
that advertisers may engage in warfare as a defensive response:
‘‘They can do little by themselves; they are in the grip of a
relentless competition which sets the pace; if their opponents
fool the public with false offers and slurring statements, they
feel they cannot afford to let the culprits get away with it and
so do likewise.’’
Consequences. Several sources again argued that hostilities
can escalate, often leading to exaggerated claims. In his
description of a war between manufacturers of refrigerators and
increasingly obsolete iceboxes, editor Larrabee (1934, 58)
noted that during a war an advertiser often ‘‘directly points the
finger at competing products and says that they are of no
value—or even harmful. Once a company commences a com-
petitive campaign of this kind it is in for a long battle with other
companies in its industry.’’ Indeed, exaggerated claims charac-
terized one of the period’s most contentious wars. In late 1937,
California orange growers attacked their Florida competitors
with the dubious claim that the juice of their oranges was
‘‘22% Richer.’’
Printers’ Ink identified the ‘‘dirty laundry effect’’ by name
in its description of a war between Royal and Knox gelatins,
after the former used ‘‘gelatine smell’’ in a disparaging attack.
‘‘If the battle of the coffees, which started when Chase &
Sanborn, another product of Standard Brands which owns
Royal, is any guide, the consumer is in for some unpleasant
months as she watches national manufacturers, forced into
competitive tactics, washing their linen in full view of the
public’’ (Knox fights back 1934, 18). Knox actually warned
consumers about exaggerations in advertising and promised
they would not do it themselves (see figure 3).
Some contributors during this period also expressed the
belief that wars could lead to damage for both sides. An agency
executive summarized this view: ‘‘And what does the old
advertiser do defensively—the obvious come-back, to our dis-
appointment, with an attack that imputes the basic quality of
the competitive product. And they both must suffer in conse-
quence, as such competitive claims can only substitute doubt
for confidence in the public mind. How unnecessary, wasteful
and foolish!’’ (Tinsman 1941, 64). A Printers’ Ink author stated
the theme even more directly: ‘‘But when one party says one
thing and the other states what seems to be a directly conflict-
ing fact, the likely conclusion of the consumer is that one of the
two is a liar—probably both’’ (Erbes 1934, 46).
Several contributors noted that combatants often became so
preoccupied with attacks that they forgot to sell their own prod-
ucts. Printers’ Ink columnist George Laflin Miller, who wrote
for decades under the pen name ‘‘Aesop Glim,’’ summarized
this view: ‘‘The temptation is to try to do or say something your
competitor has never said. The further you go along this path,
the greater the danger that you will stop using your basic sales
arguments’’ (Competitive or positive; Aesop Glim 1947, 76).
Figure 3. Knox ‘‘Warning,’’ 1934.
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Writing about the advertising war between U.S. automakers, an
observer similarly noted that ‘‘The participants are so apt to
become absorbed in strategy that they forget that their principal
job, after all, is to sell automobiles’’ (Round Four; Chevrolet
lands a blow on Ford in the three-cornered automobile fight
1933, 12).
Although one writer claimed that advertising wars often led
to ‘‘the great glee of the purveyors of white space’’ (Word War;
mayonnaise and salad dressing, steel and steel-wood motor
bodies are arguing in public 1933, 21), the majority agreed that
wars create problems for the media, leading to what advertisers
simply referred to as ‘‘censorship.’’ An observer of the Tire
Wars noted, ‘‘How do the publishers—who in the last analysis
are in the best position to censor advertising—look upon this
competitive copy? Askance, undoubtedly, but they take it’’
(Tires throwing mud 1931, 21). A publisher, writing anon-
ymously about the problems created by advertising wars,
lamented, ‘‘ . . .must the publisher always be the one to play the
part of the wet nurse? Must the publisher always be the one to
suffer when a couple of advertising prima donnas start tearing
at each other’s hair?’’ (Prima donnas at war 1937, 17).
During the early 1930s, Montgomery Ward & Co., Sears,
Roebuck & Co., and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., were among
several companies that fought a war over replacement
automobile tires. Since attacks published in their own catalogs
could not be censored, Montgomery Ward and Sears both com-
pared their private brand tires by name with those of competi-
tors. As the only one of the big five U.S. manufacturers who did
not make private brand tires, Harvey Firestone counterattacked
(see figure 4). Despite not directly identifying his mail-order
foes, many newspapers rejected the ads. Montgomery Ward
returned fire on Firestone (see figure 4) and, simultaneously,
filed a complaint with the FTC against comparative tire adver-
tising and directed at, as one source noted, ‘‘obviously that of
the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.’’ (Comparisons become invi-
dious in rivalry for tire market 1931, 9).
Sources during this period made numerous references to
how consumers respond to advertising wars. When they did,
the majority pointed to two likely consequences. First, they
noted that wars often led to confusion. Describing the war
among the Big Three U.S. automakers, Printers’ Ink summar-
ized this belief: ‘‘After reading the contradictory facts and fig-
ures, many a prospective automobile buyer must have decided
to follow Ed Wynn’s advice and buy a horse’’ (So he bought a
horse 1933, 10). Second, contributors consistently argued that
consumers rarely respond positively to advertising wars. Writ-
ing about the Cigarette Wars, an advertising executive noted,
‘‘Meanwhile the rather reasonable impression is gaining
Figure 4. Firestone and Montgomery Ward at War, 1931.
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ground that the American people do not care a Hannah Cook
about the private quarrels of advertisers . . . ’’ (When you knock
your competitor you knock advertising! 1931, 18). Referring to
an advertising war between coal and heating oil distributors, a
Printers’ Ink author similarly observed, ‘‘ . . . such a battle
would no doubt result in a condition of the buyers of these fuels
having about as much confidence in their distributors as the
average layman has in our politicians of the present day, who
have been practitioners of such tactics for a long time and are
esteemed accordingly by Mr. Average Voter’’ (Erbes 1934,
81).
As during the previous period, there were almost no positive
consequences attributed to an advertising war, with one
Depression-era exception:
. . . it is probably true that Mr. Average Tire-Buyer is more
interested—especially in this year of hard times—in price com-
parisons than he is in the word-sparring of the contestants. Con-
sequently, this advertising may be selling him more tires simply
because it is telling him more forcibly than ever before at how
low a price tires can be bought. Firestone claims that this is the
case, that sales are mounting because the public had no idea a
tire—a Firestone tire, mind you—could be bought so cheaply
(Tires throwing mud 1931, 21).
Finally, the first proposal appeared regarding how advertisers
should respond to attacks. Printers’ Ink praised Knox for not
airing dirty laundry in its counterattack. As the journal noted,
‘‘It is significant, perhaps, that Knox wisely has not interrupted
as yet the even tenor of its advertising. Its ‘Warning’ is extra
space taken with the sole purpose of fighting back and the
washing of linen in the regular campaign is noticeable by its
absence’’ (Knox fights back 1934, 19).
The 1950s and 1960s: Avis Tries Harder
Trade articles on advertising wars were infrequent during this
period, even though a major industry and regulatory scandal
occurred over fictitious comparative price advertising during
the 1950s. In addition, not only were advertisers growing
increasingly competitive in their advertising toward the end
of the 1960s, comparative advertising became a major regula-
tory headache for the TV networks (Beard and Nye 2010).
Sources for this period confirm the occurrence of several wars
between, for instance, toothpastes, margarine and butter, rental
cars, cigarettes, automobiles, and razors. Most important, the
early 1960s saw a war that many agree established the modern
era of comparative advertising—Avis Inc. versus Hertz Corpo-
ration. Although it took several years for Hertz to counterat-
tack, and their early rejection of this strategy led to an
advertising agency change, they ultimately did with the follow-
ing copy: ‘‘For years, Avis has been telling you Hertz is No. 1.
Now we’re going to tell you ‘why.’’’
Motives. Few sources mentioned motives for engaging in
advertising wars but those that did reaffirmed the earlier belief
that the decision was rarely arrived at rationally. Writing
metaphorically about an advertising war between two
hypothetical paint companies, an NBC network radio sales
promotion manager and freelance writer noted that ‘‘Asserting
that you are the leader in your field is probably good for your
ego—if your ego is the kind that requires such assertion’’
(Ecclesine 1950, 66). An American Dairy Association
executive, explaining the decision to declare war on margarine
marketers, declared he was ‘‘fighting mad and ready to slug it
out with the makers of that lower-price spread. . . . They’ve
been rough with us, such as calling us that higher-price spread,
and we’ve had enough’’ (as cited in ADA ads aim to tweak
conscience of oleo buyers 1959, 8).
The likelihood that intense competition encourages a war
was also evident in this period, with the sole reference to it sug-
gesting that increasing sales and limited competition would
reduce the odds of a counterattack. After Rambler launched
attacks against the ‘‘gas-guzzling monsters’’ of Chevrolet,
Ford, and Chrysler, a writer argued that it was unlikely they
would reply because all three were ‘‘ . . . enjoying higher sales
than at this time last year, and may simply let well enough
alone’’ (Rambler taunts trio of rivals in new ad 1959, 12).
Consequences. Several sources in this period again pointed to
the potential for wars to escalate and lead to exaggerated,
mean-spirited, and often misleading claims. Describing a
3-year war between Bostitch and 3M over the superiority of
packaging tape versus staples, a writer noted it included ads
many criticized, ‘‘such as one of a worker opening a stapled
carton and holding up a blood-soaked finger with a staple hang-
ing from it,’’ or that they ‘‘presented competing closure meth-
ods in an unfavorable light—for example, by not picturing the
proper instruments used in that method’’ (How ethics inspired
an ad treaty 1961, 38). An agency executive with 40-years
experience similarly criticized one of Hertz’s counterattacks:
‘‘As so often happens when you concentrate on competitive
experiments, the zeal of combat led this company into an ad
which many people believe hit below the belt: ‘Avis can’t
afford television commercials, aren’t you glad?’ is the head-
line . . . ’’’ (Advertising: A bare-knuckle brawl 1964, 58).
Kenneth B. Willson, then president of the National Better
Business Bureau, made the point directly: ‘‘Exaggeration by
one ‘knocking’ advertiser leads to further exaggeration by his
competitors and eventually to outright misrepresentation. . . .
As exaggerated competitive claims or half-truths are hurled
by scores of business rivals, none will have any effect at all
on any but the small unthinking part of the public’’ (as cited
in Christopher 1965, 79).
The beliefs that consumers respond negatively to wars and
that they can lead to damage to both parties were again
expressed by numerous sources. In a speech to the Advertising
Club of Greater Boston, David C. Stewart, president of agency
Kenyon & Eckhardt, summarized this belief: ‘‘There are cer-
tain industries and certain product areas today in which the bat-
tle of competitive advertising claims has reached the harsh
crescendo of jungle warfare . . . public confidence [once]
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shaken . . . [usually exerts] a stern reaction against the
industries themselves’’ (as cited in Overly competitive ads
invite action by U.S. 1965, 68).
Notably, not a single contributor directly attributed positive
outcomes to a war during this period. However, one source did
argue the possibility that both sides might benefit. ‘‘Hertz
absorbed the Avis blitz for quite some time and then came out
with a campaign of its own, stating the whole thing was little
more than a mosquito bite, and, in fact, saying that the Avis
barbs actually helped Hertz business. Perhaps the whole con-
troversy will end with that ironic discovery’’ (Just a mosquito
bite 1966, 78).
The 1970s to 1980s: Pepsi Challenges
The use of comparative advertising in the United States
expanded during the 1970s. Not only did the FTC ask the TV
networks in early 1972 to agree to a 1-year trial of comparative
advertising, the agency actually threatened industry groups
with legal action if they did not strike down codes and self-
regulation policies that limited or forbade comparisons with
named competitors. In 1982, the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB) was targeted by a U.S. Justice Department
anti-trust lawsuit. Although the legality of the comparative
advertising codes was not questioned, the NAB settled by sus-
pending all code enforcement. Consequently, wars broke out in
many product categories, including soft drinks, analgesics, fast
food, spaghetti sauces, household cleaners, razors, and Califor-
nia wines.
Motives. Only three sources directly addressed the motives
behind an advertising war during this period; again, two of
them acknowledged the emotional theme. Writing about the
evolution of comparative advertising law, an attorney warned
advertisers to avoid attacking competitors: ‘‘When a competi-
tor’s name is used, its temperature goes up and there is a greater
likelihood of a lawsuit’’ (Meyerowitz 1985, 84). The author of
a regular column in Direct Marketing similarly observed,
‘‘Sure, it feels good to get your feelings about your competition
off your chest. But if your attack results in a poor response,
that’s a pretty high price to pay for feeling good’’ (Brock
1982, 93).
The third contributor, an Advertising Age reporter, described
two related motives referenced in earlier periods. First, and
writing about the war between Procter & Gamble’s Scope and
Warner-Lambert’s Listerine, she noted, ‘‘Listerine, the com-
pany said, turned to name-calling as a last resort to defend
itself’’ (Giges 1980b, 64). Second, she suggested there might
be a growing reluctance among advertisers to engage in wars
in the first place. Referring to the outbreak of the first Cola
War, Giges (1977, 35) reported, ‘‘The signal to go after Pepsi
was eventually given by Coca-Cola’s top management after
much soul-searching and speculation about what could happen
if a Pepsi national rollout had a major impact on consumers.’’
The effects of intense competition were also quite evident
during this period; some sources, however, linked it directly
to sales declines on the part of the combatant initiating the
aggression. For instance, ‘‘Lurking behind Ragu Foods’ com-
plaints about Campbell Soup Co.’s comparative ads for Prego
spaghetti sauce is a slow but sure drop in Ragu’s market share.
And . . . the company is considering ‘alternative’ ad
approaches for fall [which could] . . . make way for a compara-
tive counterattack against Prego’’ (Dagnoli 1989, 4). The
effects of slow growth and sales declines were also evident at
the outset of the Burger Wars. As reported by one source:
‘‘Desperate to resuscitate its growth momentum, Burger King
Corp. is hitching its company fortunes to a massive compara-
tive marketing campaign, replete with ‘Pepsi challenge’-style
taste-test research . . . ’’ (Kreisman and Marshall 1982, 1).
A competitor’s entrance into a market sparked one of the
most infamous advertising wars of this or any other period.
When Johnson & Johnson subsidiary McNeil Laboratories
learned Bristol-Myers would launch Datril at a lower price and
with a comparative attack, the company invested $20 million to
send out 700 ‘‘detail men’’ to mark down every Tylenol pack-
age they could find. The goal was to nullify the Datril price
claim before the attack was launched. It is also important to
note that the price-comparison advertising war that ensued pro-
vided direct support for the FTC’s campaign to encourage com-
parative advertising and discourage self-regulation policies
against it, such as those of the NAB and the NAD. As a source
at the time noted, ‘‘The fact that J&J immediately cut the price
of Tylenol in the face of competition from Datril is bound to
catch the attention of anti-trusters at FTC and the Department
of Justice . . . ’’ (J & J slashes Tylenol’s price, objects to Datril
ad approach . . . 1975, 1).
Consequences. The belief that hostilities often escalate was
also evident during this period. Agency Ogilvy & Mather’s
chairman Andrew Kershaw (1976, 26) summarized this view:
‘‘We have already seen that ferocious hostility erupts between
corporations that used to be sensible, honorable competitors—
all because of some stupidly provocative advertising.’’ As
Johnson & Johnson and Bristol-Myers battled over the non-
aspirin market, Sterling Drug sought to slow Bayer Aspirin’s
steep decline in sales with the extraordinary attack shown in
figure 5. As an Advertising Age writer noted, ‘‘The copy
scolded the maker of Tylenol for trying to mislead consumers
in making the claim, ‘Why doctors recommend Tylenol more
than all leading aspirin brands combined’’’ (Giges 1980a, 66).
Some sources, as in earlier periods, noted that combatants
often lost focus on their own selling points. A Coca-Cola bot-
tler spoke for many: ‘‘I’ve always felt the best way to sell is to
try and communicate why consumers should buy your goods
and not why they shouldn’t buy your competitor’s . . . ’’ (as
cited in Giges 1977, 35). A Burger King executive also men-
tioned the problem of losing focus, even when referring to what
was widely considered a victory in the opening battle of the
Burger Wars: ‘‘It’s very easy to get off track. You can get so
caught up in competition that you forget the positioning’’’
(Comparative ads paying off 1984, 18).
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A Coca-Cola executive mentioned the tendency for both
sides of a war to suffer damage. He told Advertising Age that
he called a ceasefire because comparisons based on ‘‘highly
subjective areas . . . can only work to the detriment of the
industry’’ (as cited in Giges 1977, 32). Comparing the likely
consequences to an earlier decline in coffee consumption—
after coffee marketers ‘‘thought it would be smart to turn inside
and begin feeding upon each other’’—he warned executives
and bottlers: ‘‘We must never forget that the real competition
facing soft drinks is, first, and foremost, other types of liquid
refreshment’’ (as cited in Giges 1977, 32). Somewhat ironi-
cally, although Pepsi claimed victory in the Pepsi-Challenge
inspired Cola War, ‘‘Unofficially, even Pepsi sources acknowl-
edged that drastic discounting and counter moves by Coke
clouded campaign results’’ (Giges 1980b, 59).
‘‘Father of motivational research’’ Ernest Dichter warned that
consumers often respond negatively and with confusion to
advertising wars. As Dichter (1977, 8) told the members of the
American Marketing Association: ‘‘The more confusing and
vicious the mutual attacks become, the more the respondent
comes to the conclusion that he had better rely on his own judg-
ment and not on what he is being told in the ad.’’ Agency BBDO
pointed out that the smaller competitor, the ‘‘underdog,’’ tends to
benefit from an advertising war because ‘‘The American
housewife . . . can be alienated by what she feels to be an unfair
attack on one of her favorite products’’ (as cited in Underdog
advertiser wins in ‘‘naming names:’’ BBDO 1975, 1).
Two additional consequences found expression during this
period. First, a few sources agreed with agency Ogilvy &
Mather that both sides of a war may benefit. Consistent with
this belief, a McNeil marketing executive said the company
‘‘does not feel the Datril advertising has been detrimental to
Tylenol. The company is now shipping all the products it can
make, and the ads have had the effect of acquainting consumers
with Tylenol as well as Datril . . . ’’ (as cited in Giges 1975, 61).
Second, after Burger King agreed to an out-of-court settlement
with McDonald’s Corporation and Wendy’s International, the
executive who ordered the attack praised its publicity value.
He told Advertising Age that the media attention alone may
have been worth as much as $20 million in added sales (as cited
in Moran 1984).
Several successful tactics for responding to attacks were
mentioned during this period. For instance, Cola-Cola used
brand Fresca as a ‘‘stalking horse’’ in one of its first responses
to the Pepsi Challenge (Giges 1977). The stalking horse is an
exercise in misdirection and risk assessment. A surrogate is
used to launch an attack—in this case, Fresca, rather than the
Coca-Cola flagship brand—to assess the likelihood of success
or failure. Second, in another indirect counterattack, Coca-Cola
responded with a campaign designed to disparage Pepsi’s taste-
test advertising. A Coca-Cola executive explained to Advertis-
ing Age: ‘‘We felt like we weren’t really knocking Pepsi, which
we didn’t want to do, but we were knocking the technique an
advertiser was using—and that advertiser just happened to be
our competitor, Pepsi’’ (as cited in Giges 1977, 75).
A third strategy was demonstrated in a response to a Busi-
ness Week magazine attack on the Wall Street Journal. The
ad in question had shown the Journal stuffed in a wastepaper
basket and implied that the Friday issue had little value. Rather
than respond directly, the Journal ‘‘ . . . retaliated in a low-key
way. It ran a spread ad in the March 22 issue of Advertising Age
showing a backseat rider in a Rolls-Royce asking: ‘Did you see
that story in Friday’s Journal?’ Although it made the point that
the Journal was ‘top-of-the-day reading every business day,’ it
especially touted the Friday Journal as a wrap-up of the week’s
events’’ (Emmrich 1982, M6). Finally, as advertising wars
broke out among financial institutions during this period of
recession, bank failures, and deregulation, one marketing man-
ager chose not to ‘‘slam an ad into the media’’ in response to a
competitor’s claim to pay the highest rate of return on IRAs
(Individual Retirement Account) (Case of the IRA affair
1985, 11) but instead gave frontline representatives additional
training to explain the differences in the investment programs
to customers on a one-on-one basis.
The 1990s to 2000s: Credit Card Wars, Beer Wars, and
a Pizza War
Although the data do not lend themselves to quantitative anal-
ysis, it seems likely that advertising wars have been more
Figure 5. Bayer Aspirin’s attack on Tylenol, 1980.
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frequent during this period than any other. Several wars carried
over from the 1980s (e.g., the Analgesic Wars, Burger Wars,
and Credit Card Wars) and many new ones broke out in
industries such as cell phone services, computer hardware and
software, pizza, brewing, batteries, satellite TV services, coffee,
condensed and ready-to-eat soups, and sports drinks, to name
just a few. As in the beginning, many advertisers condemned
attack advertising. A Microsoft executive captured the view of
many: ‘‘I don’t think there’s ever been a study that shows that
negative advertising sells products’’ (as cited in Jaben 1992, 3).
Motives. As in previous periods, sources either implied or
stated directly that the decision to respond to an attack was
often an emotional, rather than a rational, one. Referring to the
Credit Card Wars, an Advertising Age writer noted, ‘‘Some
analysts say the efforts are better at soothing CEOs’ egos than
swaying public opinion’’ (Levin 1994, 4). In the Long-Distance
War, an Adweek writer reported that ‘‘Neither AT&T nor MCI
were running ads for consumers; instead, they were targeting
each other’s boardrooms. . . . They were meant to get the other
guy’s goat’’ (Benezra 1998, 46). In reference to the Soup War
between General Mills (Progresso) and Campbell Soup (Select
Harvest), James P. Othmer (author of Adland: Searching for
the Meaning of Life on a Branded Planet) told The New York
Times: ‘‘They’re navel-gazing and they’re not thinking about
what consumers want to hear—they’re just talking at confer-
ence tables about how to strike back or how their integrity has
been affected’’ (as cited in Clifford 2009, A1).
The effects of intense competition were clearly apparent in
the description of nearly every advertising war that occurred
during this period. Moreover, and as reported during earlier
periods, counterattacks were sometimes motivated by the per-
ception that advertisers needed to defend themselves. An obser-
ver of the Long-Distance War offered an example: ‘‘Ma Bell
[AT&T] tried to ignore MCI’s nonstop attacks, but its compet-
itor’s blows were clearly drawing blood’’ (Benezra 1998, 46).
Similarly, another source proposed that after Visa USA
invested millions of dollars in an official Olympic sponsorship,
the company was forced to respond to American Express
ambush advertising: ‘‘The Visa-American Express standoff is
a bit testy, the public display of a bitter behind-the-scenes battle
in which Visa is fighting to protect its investment’’ (Davidson
1996, 11). A Pizza Hut executive summarized the thinking
behind this motive succinctly: ‘‘If you want to call it aggres-
sive, that’s your decision. We feel we have to take remedial
action to set the record straight with consumers’’ (as cited in
Kramer 1999, 4).
Consequences. Several sources also noted the tendency for
advertisers to regret becoming involved in advertising wars.
No one, however, throughout the 100 years of data analyzed for
this study summarized the theme of regret as clearly and color-
fully as a soldier in the Spaghetti Sauce War: ‘‘between [Uni-
lever and Campbell], we’re spending $60 million a year to
convince consumers that our spaghetti sauce is really crappy’’
(as cited in Neff 1999, 26).
The belief that advertising wars tend to escalate was also
evident in this final period, with many specific examples. In
late 1994, for instance, the attacks and counterattacks between
Visa USA and American Express Co. became increasingly hos-
tile, following American Express’s launch of its Optima True
Grace card. After the card was launched with the promise there
would be no interest charges during the grace period, Visa USA
fired the salvo in figure 6.Within days, American Express replied
with a counterattack, also shown in figure 6, including the satiric
‘‘Visa. It’s everywhere you want to pay more interest charges.’’
The rush to counterattack may help explain why American
Express failed to identify itself in its own full-page newspaper ad.
In the Beer Wars, which continue today between Anheuser-
Busch and Miller Brewing, combatants often turned their
attacks to the quality of opponents’ products. In one of the most
infamous examples, Anheuser-Busch ran commercials criticiz-
ing Coors Brewing Co. for diluting its ‘‘pure Rocky Mountain
Spring Water’’ with local water, once the Coors Light concen-
trate reached Northeastern markets. Two years later, Anheuser-
Busch launched an almost identical attack on Boston Beer
Company, with a campaign revealing that Sam Adams was
regionally brewed by other brewers under contract. In perhaps
one of the most juvenile examples of the theme of hostility
escalation, during a spring 2009 broadcast of ‘‘American Idol,’’
Domino’s Pizza President David Brandon used a 450-degree
pizza oven to torch a Subway cease-and-desist letter, which
challenged the results of a national taste test.
Other wars revealed the tendency for hostilities to escalate,
leading to dirty laundry and mutual damage. As competition
increased in the computer business, some attempted to exploit
consumers’ fears of technology with warnings of how difficult
their competitors’ products were to use. Others, such as Com-
paq Computer Corp., implied competitors were on the verge of
going bankrupt (Johnson 1993). In the Pizza Wars, Papa John’s
and Pizza Hut accused (and sued) each other over advertised
attacks that one or the other was serving customers either
six-day-old dough or stale sauce. This latter episode provided
a stunning example of the ‘‘dirty laundry effect,’’ as summar-
ized by an observer: ‘‘Part of the court hearings involved both
chains revealing less than appetizing facts about their sauce
preparation processes’’ (Edwards 2001, 28).
However, few wars more perfectly illustrate hostility escala-
tion and its consequences than Tylenol versus Advil. As one
writer concluded, ‘‘ . . . the main educational benefit of the
Tylenol-Advil war has been to teach the public that you can’t
believe anything you hear, that the world is unsafe, and that
drug companies, behaving like cynical cutthroats, are no better
than, well, politicians’’ (Goldman 1996, 25). After Tylenol user
Antonio Benedi successfully sued Johnson & Johnson for dam-
age to his liver, he published a letter criticizing the company in
his hometown newspaper. Advil manufacturer American Home
Products then obtained permission to publish the letter in The
New York Times (see figure 7). As the same writer noted, ‘‘In
one voice, the Wall Street analysts and the packaged-goods
consultants decried the public confidence-eroding gambit as
suicidal for the industry’’ (Goldman 1996, 26).
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Many sources also mentioned the tendency for combatants
to lose focus on selling their products. In the Hardware War,
Compaq ran an ad calling for a ceasefire, including the copy
‘‘Mudslinging, be it at a political candidate or a computer com-
pany, serves little purpose other than to muddy the waters’’
(Jaben 1992, 3). Referring to the Credit Card Wars, the chair-
man of a New York management consultancy observed, ‘‘It
almost becomes defensive communications . . . . The benefit
message is so clouded in irritable language and sort of bullying
tactics that I just think most people tune it out’’’ (Levin 1994,
2). Explaining his decision not to join other software vendors in
an alliance against Microsoft, a WordPerfect VP-marketing
told Business Marketing: ‘‘There are times when alliances
make a lot of sense, but if the alliance is formed for any other
reason than to benefit the customer, it can get off focus’’ (as
cited in Jaben 1992, 3).
Advertising Age summarized many of these problems in an
editorial about the Pizza War: ‘‘Yet there’s a line that should
not be crossed. On the wrong side of that line is advertising that
loses sight of its selling mission in its eagerness to score points
at the rival’s expense. Pizza Hut has arrived at that point in its
ad war with rival Papa John’s’’ (A food fight out of control
1999, 16). The executive director of a global brand consultancy
similarly observed: ‘‘I would advise them that they are
completely missing the point. . . . They’re denigrating a brand
in the category instead of building their own brand. For any
company, I can tell you this advice would be the same’’ (as
cited in Edwards 2001, 30).
The role of the media as arbiters of warfare was also
addressed during this period. Fearing it was losing the Cola
War, Coca-Cola Co. led a drive to pressure U.S. TV networks
to revise their clearance practices. The company called for the
change after it took between six weeks and three months for the
networks to stop airing a spot in which Pepsi claimed Diet
Pepsi was ‘‘the taste that beats Diet Coke’’ (Winters and Wal-
ley 1990, 1). Another source observed that the televised portion
of the Tylenol-Advil war came to an end when ‘‘In the face of
all the hubbub and confusion, television networks refused to air
the worst of slash-and-burn executions’’ (Goldman 1996, 26).
Network ABC actually banned all comparative drug company
spots.
Several sources also mentioned the concern consumers
would respond negatively and with confusion. The CEO of
agency BBDO/LA observed: ‘‘If the negative advertising is
scary and manipulative, it’s a disaster for a brand’’ (as cited
in Jaben 1992, 3). A Visa USAmarketing executive pointed out
that ‘‘You risk coming off like a bully and no brand really
wants that’’ (as cited in Koprowski 1995, 22). Regarding the
Figure 6. American Express and Visa at War, 1994.
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Figure 7. Antonio Benedi letter, 1996.
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Credit Card Wars, the president of ad agency Slater Hanft Mar-
tin noted, ‘‘Our research shows consumers don’t want to be a
pawn in the fight. They feel the companies are not interested
in them and only want to make a sale’’ (as cited in Koprowski
1995, 22). A veteran of the Hardware Wars also pointed to the
concern with backlash: ‘‘Last year we responded to negative
advertising by IBM by being negative about OS/2. We got
word our customers didn’t like it, and we stopped. We were
told being negative was not what customers wanted to hear’’
(as cited in Jaben 1992, 3).
Regarding the war among battery marketers, a senior
VP-marketing noted, ‘‘I think it’s caused consumer
confusion . . . . People hear what are accurate claims [from
different types of tests] but contradictory from one competitor
to another. . . . And because of that, I don’t think consumers
know what to believe and tend to be more skeptical about the
claims’’ (as cited in Neff 1999, 26). This wasn’t the only view,
however. As a Visa advertising executive observed,
‘‘ . . . veracity tempers an advertising counteroffensive. If
people know it’s true, that takes away the negative association’’
(as cited in Koprowski 1995, 22).
Summary and Conclusions
In general, the findings of this historical study reveal that, at
least according to sources published in the marketing and
advertising trade literature, advertisers’ motives for engaging
in advertising warfare, concerns about the potential conse-
quences that might occur, and the consequences that actually
did occur, remained quite consistent throughout the past 100
years. Especially noteworthy is the harmonious nature of these
beliefs and experiences, as well as the lack of contradictory
beliefs.
Specific findings point to the identification of many of the
‘‘principles and problems, potential and pitfall’’ that Startt and
Sloan (1989) suggest historical research may facilitate. For
instance, it seems apparent that advertising wars may be
responsible for many of the negative consequences Pope
(1983) attributed to comparative or knocking advertising alone.
As the findings of this study show, these consequences—the
creation of potentially misleading advertisements, damage to
advertising’s institutional credibility, and the employment of
a mutually damaging form of business rivalry—were among
those that often occurred when an advertiser’s intended victim
chose, instead, to become a foe. These findings are also consis-
tent with those of Beard and Nye (2010), who found that the
validity of comparative claims was one of the principal regula-
tory problems comparative advertising created for the media,
as its use expanded in the 1960s and 1970s.
As Grewal et al. (1997, 3) note, ‘‘The potential for increas-
ing consumers’ information was one reason the FTC reputedly
did not condemn comparisons ads.’’ Indeed, the FTC began
encouraging comparative advertising for exactly this reason.
Ironically, the tendency for advertisers to respond to compara-
tive attacks emotionally, for hostilities to escalate, and for
advertisers to increasingly lose focus on their own selling
points and benefits all suggest that the benefit of much
comparative advertising envisioned by the FTC would be
unlikely to occur. Similarly, some academic and industry
studies suggest consumers often do not respond positively to
comparative advertising (for a summary, see Grewal et al.
1997). Sorescu and Gelb (2000, 26) also note the ‘‘Principal
downside to negative advertising is backlash: the perception
that negative advertising is unfair or in some other way unde-
sirable.’’ The findings of this study reveal that advertisers were
aware of and concerned about this unintended consequence,
negative consumer attitudes, throughout the previous century.
The finding that there were often negative outcomes for both
combatants and eventually a reluctance to become involved in
an advertising war are consistent with recent theory and
research on combative advertising. Chen et al. (2009) analyzed
the effects of combative advertising and concluded that it could
lead to procompetitive outcomes where both firms become col-
lectively worse off because an advertising war often leads to a
price war. This study’s findings reveal that advertising wars
often did occur simultaneously with price wars.
In a conceptual piece on aggressive attack advertising,
Beard (2008, 55) speculated about what advertisers should do
if they are the victims of an attack: ‘‘Should they respond?’’
The findings of this study provide some insights into what the
answer to this question might be. Many advertisers expressed
regret that they became engaged in advertising wars and, later
in the century, began openly acknowledging reluctance to do
so. Advertisers should take this into account when considering
a response. The findings also point to specific questions that
could be asked to assess risk. For instance, is the company,
product, or brand especially vulnerable to counterattack? The
findings of this study suggest that the answer to this question
may almost always be yes. Does the advertiser’s industry have
dirty laundry? If so, and should hostilities escalate, how likely
or severe is the damage that may occur?
Others findings related to responding to an attack point to
the possibility that it might be done while avoiding many of the
negative consequences of an advertising war. Sources through-
out the past 100 years consistently warned that, should adver-
tisers choose to counterattack, they should take special care
to stay focused on their own selling points, benefits, and posi-
tions. Such a strategy would likely help avoid the escalation of
hostilities. More important, and although they were probably
not knowingly adopting military strategy, the findings reveal
that some advertisers occasionally responded to attacks with
what military strategists would call ‘‘flanking maneuvers,’’
used to avoid direct, head-on confrontations. Today’s adverti-
sers could learn from the experiences of, for instance, Knox
gelatin, Coca-Cola, and the Wall Street Journal.
The findings and conclusions of this study are, of course,
limited. For example, as noted earlier, although the method is
consistent with those of humanistic and empirical historical
research, it lacks clear evidence for validity or reliability. Thus,
the findings cannot be assumed to be representative of the
beliefs of a majority of all advertisers or marketers in any
period, but only those of the sources themselves. This study
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is also limited by the sources used for the latter decades of the
twentieth century and first decade of the twenty-first century,
mainly in that advertisers and executives themselves were gen-
erally no longer primary sources. Their beliefs and opinions,
although often still in their own words, became filtered by the
journalists who interviewed them.
Future research on advertising wars could partly address the
limitation of generalizability by identifying a large sample of
advertisements representing attacks and counterattacks and
content analyzing them. Researchers Karen James and Paul
Hensel (1991) argue that a mere comparative ad, in which a
competitor is identified for the purposes of claiming superior-
ity, becomes an attack based on (1) the degree to which the tar-
geted competitor is identified, (2) whether the direction of the
comparison is differentiative versus associative (i.e., products
are presented as different rather than similar), and (3) the extent
to which consumers are likely to perceive the advertising to be
particularly malicious or unfair. Coding and analyzing attacks
and counterattacks using these tactical characteristics would
provide valuable insight into an important question suggested
by one of this study’s major findings: In what specific ways
do advertisers lose focus on their own selling points and mes-
sage strategies?
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